HRS §626:1-609
When past crimes can be used to question a witness's honesty
This rule says a witness's past crimes can only be used to question their truthfulness if the crime involves dishonesty, like lying or fraud. Other crimes, even serious ones, are usually not allowed for this purpose. The court has discretion to decide what is fair.
courts
The statute, as written — (q)), which provided for discretionary receipt, for credibility assessment of all witnesses other than criminal accused, of evidence of "felonies, or of misdemeanors involving moral turpitude." This s
tatute was authoritatively construed in Asato v. Furtado, 52 H. 284, 292-93, 474 P.2d 288, 294-295 (1970): We think that there are a great many criminal offenses the conviction of which has no bearing whatsoever upon the witness' propensity for lying or truthtelling, and that such convictions ought not to be admitted for purposes of impeachment.... This is true not only of minor offenses like parking tickets ... but also of some major offenses like murder or assault and battery. It is hard to see any rational connection between, say, a crime of violence and the likelihood that the witness will tell the truth.... For these reasons, we think it unwise to admit evidence of any and all convictions on the issue of credibility. We hold that admission of such evidence should be limited to those convictions that are relevant to the issue of truth and veracity. A perjury conviction, for example, would carry considerable probative value in a determination of whether a witness is likely to falsify under oath. We also think that other crimes that fall into the class of crimes involving dishonesty or false statement would have some value in a rational determination of credibility. Subsection (a): The first sentence of this subsection reflects the wisdom of Asato v. Furtado, supra. The phrase "dishonesty or false statement," which appears in Asato and in Fed. R. Evid. 609(a), becomes simply "dishonesty" in the present rule. The intent is that crimes "involving dishonesty" be construed to include crimes involving false statement. The negative phraseology (the evidence "is inadmissible except when the crime is one involving dishonesty") is employed to make it clear that Rule 403's discretionary balance governs the question of admissibility under this rule. For purposes of this balance, the relevance of a prior conviction involving dishonesty will depend primarily upon the nature of the crime and the age of the conviction. The second sentence of Rule 609(a) tracks the language of the previous statute, and implements the due process mandate of State v. Santiago, 53 H. 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971). Subsections (b), (c), (d): Subsection (b) of this rule, relating to the effect of a pardon upon the admissibility of a prior conviction, is similar to Fed. R. Evid. 609(c). Subsection (c), relating to the admissibility of juvenile adjudications, treats them as admissible "to the same extent as are criminal convictions under subsection (a)." This section, like the first sentence of subsection (a), is subject to the court's discretion under Rule 403 supra, to exclude relevant evidence when probative value is substantially outweighed by prejudicial impact or other negative factors. Subsection (d), regarding the pendency of an appeal from the previous conviction, is identical with Fed. R. Evid. 609(e).
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